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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR 0. 
STEWART and GRANT HINCHCLIFF, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Case No. 19022 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action brought by Marjorie J. Durand 
arising out of a shoot out on the 21st day of February, 1979, 
in a trailer court in the north part of Cedar City, Iron County, 
State of Utah. Mrs. Durand was an occupant of a trailer in the 
court. 
One Neil Anderson, together with his brother, operated 
a motor vehicle repair shop on the north edge of Cedar City. 
Neil Anderson lived in the same trailer court as Mrs. Durand, 
only a few doors from Mrs. Durand?s trailer. Exhibits MDM and 
flE" attached hereto give a relative location of these two 
trailers in the trailer court, although they are not drawn to 
scale. 
Neil Anderson and his brother had a local reputation of 
indulging in alcohol in the later part of the day. On this 
particular evening, they became quite drunk and started up town. 
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They were picked up by police of Cedar City and taken to the police 
station. The brother of Neil Anderson was driving. While in all 
probability that had had drink for drink, the officers called 
Neil Anderson's wife to come and get him; the officers then 
processed the brother for driving while under the influence of 
alcohol. Mrs. Anderson took her husband home although he had a 
reputation of shooting it out with police officers, threatening 
police officers, and items of this nature. When he became 
belligerent and started back to town, making threats to go back 
to town to get his brother, Mrs. Anderson called the police. The 
police responded; the shoot out occurred; and as part of the shoot 
out, Mrs. Durand was injured. 
Mrs. Durand signed a notice and the same was served upon 
Cedar City Corporation as a notice of claim within the statutory 
period. A complaint was filed, and a motion was made for the court 
to set a bond for bringing an action against officers of a city. 
In the due course of events, an order was filed requiring a $300.00 
bond. The bond was posted in cash as a $600.00 property bond. 
In the due course of events, the defendants filed a 
Motion for Summary Judgment, which was overruled and denied, on 
the 7th day of May, 1982, by the District Court of Iron County. 
See Exhibit "A" attached hereto. This reserved to the defendants 
the right to renew the motion at the time of pretrial. At the 
time of the pretrial, the motion was renewed. Without additional 
evidence or without additional affidavits, the court ruled 
that the summary judgment should be granted. This is the 
only item that the court decided. No other question was decided 
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by the court at that time; Exhibit "B", "Summary Judgment," 
dated the 1st day of February, 1983, is the result thereof. There 
is as part of the record on appeal, a short court proceeding of 
the 7th day of January, 1983, in which the argument was submitted. 
The court specifically refused to rule on any other point. See 
transcript of January 7, 1983, page 4, line 17-19, inclusive. 
This appeal is based on that specific ruling, and is an appeal 
from the order graning the motion for summary judgment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On January 7, 1983, the trial court saw fit to grant 
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The plaintiff and appellant, Marjorie J. Durand, seeks 
to have summary judgment granted by the court reversed and this 
situation sent to a fact finder for proper disposition and findings 
of fact on the matter0 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff along prior to the occurrence complained 
of, had been employed in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah 
as a supervisor of telephone operators in Cedar City, Utah, by 
Mountain Bell. She had been steadily employed in this capacity 
for a number of years. For a considerable period prior to the 
time of the matter complained of, the plaintiff had lived in 
trailer space #24, at 1027 North Main Street, Cedar City, Utah, 
in an organized trailer court. Neil Anderson lived in a neighbor-
ing trailer. 
Prior to the 21st day of February, 1979, Neil Anderson 
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and his brother were self-employed as mechanics in an automotive 
repair institution in Cedar City, Iron County, State of Utah. 
At times they had been involved with intoxicants and had prior 
histories with the Cedar City police force. The fact that each 
of them became bellicose and argumentative when interfered with 
was known by police officers. On occasion, each had threatened 
to use fire arms in connection with what they termed "police 
harassment;" they had on occasion prior to the 21st day of February, 
1979, interfered with police officers in the due performance of 
their duty while the Anderson brothers were under the influence of 
alcohol, Neil Anderson's brother!s name is Eugene Anderson. In 
the Anderson family there had been a prior history of shootings 
under these conditions. All of these items were well known to 
the Cedar City police officers. 
\ 
Upon the evening of the 21st day of February, 1979, 
the defendant Grant Hinchcliff and another Cedar City police 
officer by the name of Bruce Marshall stopped a vehicle on north 
Main Street in Cedar City, Utah, because of the manner in which 
it was being driven. Eugene Anderson was driving the vehicle; 
Neil Anderson was riding as a passenger in said vehicle. Both 
Eugene Anderson and Neil Anderson were taken into custody by the 
officers. The officers then proceeded in the investigation of 
the driving while under the influence of alcohol incident. They 
took both of the Anderson brothers to the police station to apply 
a breathylizer test to the driver, to-wit: Eugene Anderson. Neil 
Anderson was taken to the police office as part of this proceeding. 
While attempting to process the driving-while-under-the-
influence charges against Eugene Anderson, there was interference 
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H. L. Bradley, Arthur 0. Stewart and Grant Hinchcliff, function-
ing as officers of the defendant Cedar City Corporation. At the 
time of responding to said call, the defendants Bradley and Stewart 
had actual knowledge of the previous conduct of Neil Anderson in 
the police station that night, having obtained the same from 
Officer Hinchcliff. Both Bradley and Stewart had actual know-
ledge that he had made prior threats against police officers 
whild under the influence of alcohol. They also had actual 
knowledge that he was under the influence of alcohol on this 
particular evening. 
The officers approached the trailer of Neil Anderson; 
the defendant H. L. Bradley entered the trailer, saw Neil 
Anderson sitting down with a rifle crosswise his knees, the 
bolt open, attempting to insert ammunition into the same. This 
was from a distance of approximately four feet. The officers • •-• 
allowed Neil Anderson to load the gun; the officers retreated as 
is shown by their affidavits, which are attached hereto as 
i 
Exhibits "C", "D", and ME". After considerable altercation 
with Mr. Neil Anderson, with him on the porch and two of the 
officers in protective positions, the shoot out commenced. Neil 
Anderson fired two or three shots, each of which were heard by 
the defendants Arthur 0. Stewart and Grant Hinchcliff, none of 
which could have been the shots that injured the plaintiff. 
As a result of the shoot out, the plaintiff, sitting 
in her own home, minding her own business, watching television, 
was severely wounded. The damage she has complained of resulted 
therefrom. In addition, Neil Anderson was killed. 
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POINT • I 
THERE ARE ISSi.r. • n i-VT TO BE DECIDED BY A 
FACT FINDER 
Attached hereto arc Exhibits MC M, "P' ;u;d "!• *w. • 
are the affidavits of the three police officer* -n^ aj^ f-
shoot-out. in Exh-t-i: IM( :it j idav « oi OIH 0>-ani s<!-i tjfliff, 
in paragraph i wu, telus oj" stopping Eugen< Anderson H 11^  V-i' 
Anderson because the vehicle >ra- !•< i<f * : * w« » • h* . iiuence 
of J i oiiO 1 ' n paragraph thi <>c oi t:h i s x^ti 1 h J f , u sta • cs 
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Anderson were intoxicated. Eugene was informed 
by Officer Marshall that he was being placed 
under arrest for driving under the influence of 
alcohol Both Andersons were taken to the Iron 
County Jail to process Eugene Anderson's arrest 
and make arrangements for both men to be trans-
ported home. ?! 
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"Neil Anderson demonstrated wide emotional 
swings during this time but was controllable 
a t a ] I times and did not behave in a manner 
necessitation his incarceration fen disorderly 
behavior or other similar charge ,! 
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This statement is made, although this sentence in paragraph four 
states: 'This was necessary to prevent his interference with 
the breathalyzer tests." A previous statement shows that it 
was necessary for an officer to control Neil Anderson while his 
brother was given the breathalyzer test. Paragraph five relates 
to Neil Anderson's wife being called. An officer placed Neil 
Anderson in the passenger side of the car. The affidavit, marked 
as Exhibit MC" states that a call from Mrs. Anderson was 
received and she requested help, and that this officer together 
with one Sergeant Bradley went to the trailer. Thereafter, the 
shoot-out occurred. 
Exhibits "D" and "E", which are the affidavits of 
Officers Bradley and Stewart show that at the time they responded 
to the call that they were aware of the prior arrest of the 
Anderson brothers and the fact that Neil Anderson was drunk, 
belligerent and making trouble. 
Exhibit "F" shows the claim that was filed with Cedar 
City. 
Exhibits MAM and MB M are the contrary findings pertaining 
to the summary judgment of the trial judge. 
Exhibits "CM, MD", and ME M and the accompanying diagrams 
show, by giving affect to the fact of them, that it was impossible 
for Mrs. Durand to have been hit by Neil Anderson's bullets. They 
show without question that while Hinchcliff participated in the 
earlier arrest for drunk driving and the earlier work in connec-
tion with Neil Anderson, that the other two officers were aware 
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are entirely without fault. There are two specific items of 
evidence in this matter that the court needs to determine, to-
wit: 
1. The actions of the defendant Hinchcliff in turning 
loose a person under the influence of alcohol. 
27 The actions of all three officers in the shoot out, 
bearing in mind that the prior knowledge they had and the chance 
they had had to disarm Neil Anderson. 
The Utah State Supreme Court has held for a long period 
of time that if there is any action of fact or any question of 
fact, that a summary judgment should not be allowed. This pertains 
not only to damage cases such as we are talking about, but the 
same applies to any other case. 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the effect 
of same on cases, we have the following items that we should be 
concerned about, to-wit: 
Bill Brown Realty, Inc. v. Leah N. Abbott, 562 P.2d, 
238; Pace v.Pace, 559 P.2d, 964; Madsen v. Prudential, 558 P.2d, 
1337. Burrows v. McGill, 563 P.2d, 189; Durham v. Margetts, 
571 P.2d, 1332; Sandberg v. Klein, 576 P.2d 1291; and Rees v. 
Albertson' s, Inc., 587 P.2d, 130. These particular cases are on 
myriad subjects. They hold that summary judgment should not 
be granted. The Rees v. Albertsonfs Inc., on page 133, contains 
the following statement: 
"To be considered in connection with 
what has been said above are these principles: 
that the questions relating to negligence 
and proximate cause are generally for the 
fact-trier, court or jury, to determine. A 
party should not be deprived of the privilege 
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of having such an adjudication of his claims 
unless it appears that even upon the facts 
claimed by him he could not establish a basis 
for recovery. Moreover, when there is doubt 
about the matter, it should be resolved in 
favor of permitting the party to go to trial0n 
Applying this to the case at bar, we come to the conclusion that 
the only possibility of having a summary judgment of no cause of 
action is, that even if the facts as claimed by Mrs. Durand are 
true, that there can be no recovery should there be a summary 
judgment. 
We have found in negligence cases and guest cases that 
a person should be responsible when he consciously chooses a course 
of action that places others in danger. This may be done by 
inattentive driving and oftentimes this has been called conduct 
evidencing a wreckless disregard for the safety of others. This 
has been applied in automobile cases. State v. Berchtold, 11 
Utah 2d, 208, 357 P.2d 183; and State v. Selman, 18 Utah 2d. 199, 
417 P. 2d 975. Applying this to the case at bar, when an officer 
turns loose a person under the influence of liquor, knowing that 
he has a propensity for troubles, do we free the officer from the 
trouble that results and do we do so by summary judgment without 
evidence? There seems to be no question that there should be a 
finding of fact as to whether or not the defendants were guilty 
of negligence. 
POINT II 
THAT THE DEFENDANTS HAD A DUTY TO PROTECT THE 
PLAINTIFF FROM HARM 
To answer this question, one must take a look at what 
is the duty of a police officer and of a city that hires police 
officers to its citizens. 
_ 11 
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There can be no question that the primary duty of police 
officers is to protect the health, lives, and morals of the people 
in the area that they are responsible for. This is found in Corpus 
Juris Secundum on "Police," Volume 72, page 207 in general prase-
ology. There are many definitions of the word "police" and of 
the word "police regulation." Volume 72, page 206-207, gives us 
three classifications, to-wit: 
1. Measures which are adopted to keep order, the laws 
and ordinances on cleanliness, health, and so on in effect. 
2. To procure to the authorities the means of detect-
ing the smallest attempts to commit crime, in order that the 
guilty may be arrested before their plans are carried into 
execution and delivered to the justice of the country. 
3. The third phase is the comprehension itself of 
the laws and the measure which require the citizens to exercise 
their rights. 
These duties were owed to Mrs. Durand as well as to every other 
citizen in the area. 
A city is to set up a police force as delegated to 
cities and towns by virtue of Article 11, Section 5, of the 
Utah Consititution. 
There can be no question that the first duty of any 
officer is to prevent the violation of law. Under these condi-
tions when they picked up Neil Anderson, as long as he was under 
the influence of liquor, they should have arrested him and gone 
forward with the prosecution for public intoxication under 
the provisions of Title 32-7-13, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
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as amended, and under an appropriate Cedar City ordinance. How-
ever, when officers make themselves judges and juries and find a 
person that should not be confined and turn him loose, in a 
known inebriated condition, the officers that turned him loose 
should be held accountable for his conduct. And those that create 
damage, knowing he has been turned loose, should also be held 
accountable. 
Certainly the duty owed to Mrs. Durand by the officers 
was the same duty as owed to everyone else in the area by the 
officers and by the city. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFfS CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT 
In all probability, items of this nature are the very 
reason for the label of governmental immunities. In our legal 
system, there are always abuses that bring everything to a head. 
This gives rise to two questions: First, whether or not there 
can be any recovery whatsoever on an action of this nature under 
the Governmental Immunity Act; and second, whether or not the 
Governmental Immunity Act has been complied with. 
Pertaining to the first part of this question, Section 
63-30-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, had an amendment 
in 1983. Prior to that time, the last amendment was in 1975. 
At the beginning of the section as established in 1975, set forth 
in the 1978 revision of Volume 7 A, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
it states as follows: 
nImmunity from suit of all governmental 
entites is waived for injury proximately 
caused by a negligent act or omission of 
an employee committed within the scope of 
his employment except if the injury..." Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
After the 1978 revision, there are eleven exceptions,, The format 
in the 1983 revision is different; there are some additional 
exceptionse The contents and the meaning of same are quite 
similar. For purposes of this discussion, we probably should 
consider the 1975 revision as set forth in the 1978 volume of 
7 A, Utah Code Annotated. Very probably this is the law that was 
in effect in 1979, at the time that this act took place rather 
than the present law. The only item of exception that we should 
be concerned about is the first one., It reads, to-wit: 
!!arises out of the exercise or performance 
or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the 
discretion is abused.!! 
This again brings us squarely to the question of what 
is an officer!s duty when he takes into custody a known drunk 
that is drunk and he has been taken into custody as a drunk. It 
again brings us to Officer Hinchcliff's affidavit which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C". Paragraph three thereof, 
which is quoated as follows: "It was apparent that both Eugene 
and Neil Anderson were intoxicated.tf It is not a discretionary 
function to prosecute a person for drunkenness or for being 
intoxicated. It is a matter of duty. The effect of the 
summary judgment is to say that the officer has discretion. The 
same is true pertaining to whether or not Officer Bradley acted 
properly in backing out of the trailer instead of disarming 
Neil Anderson when he had a chance to do so, These are discre-
tionary duties of the police officer. The finding of the summary 
judgment claims otherwise. 
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If we have given the officer discretion as to whether 
or not he can arrest a person that is intoxicated, then we must 
also give him discretion as to whether or hot he must arrest a bank 
robber0 Under these conditions, neither of these functions can 
be termed to come under the first exception to the waiver of 
immunity for the act of an officer or by a negligent act or 
ommission of an employee committed within the scope of his 
employment. 
The other question, of course, goes to Section 63-30-
13 to 63-30-19, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. Section 
63-30-19 has not been changed. Section 63-30-13 at the time of 
the acts complained of, required a notice of claim within three 
months, The 1983 Legislature has changed that to one year. The 
plaintiff contends that the notice was given while under the 
three-month time limitation and that the bond was posted. The 
defendants raised these items by motion, but they were not decided 
by the court. The court in its decision on the 7th day of 
January, 1983, as stated above, specifically decided no question 
except granting the summary judgment. The Court did not give 
the reason therefore on any basis pertaining to the Governmental 
Immunity Act. Certainly there is a conflict on this, and 
certainly it is an item that should go to proof. 
A very interesting case that may have some merit 
in relation to this question and to the summary judgment 
question is the case of Schmitt v. Billings, 560 P.2d 516. 
The very nill of that case is in the procedural questions that 
-1.R-
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are not applicable here. It was remanded for further proceed-
ings, with findings that there were items of controversy to be 
decided by the court, with further comments that appear to be 
dicta to the effect that Section 10 of Title 63-30-10, does 
not appear that the three individuals from tortious acts. The 
questions in this case appear to be decided on procedural 
situations and not on merit. 
Under these conditions, it is believed by the under-
signed that it is as a matter of law, the Governmental Immunity 
Act does not prevent a defense for any defendant, with the possible 
exception that Title 63-30-20, if at the time of the trial be 
applicable in such a fashion that it may limit recovery from 
all defendants. Under these circumstances, there can be no 
question that the case at bar should go to trial, and 
the questions concerning the conduct of the officers as to 
whether or not it is a proper standard under the circumstances 
should be submitted to a fact-finder and whether damages should 
be assessed against the defendants. 
CONCLUSION
 ; 
The finding of the trial court in relation to summary 
judgment should be reversed and the matter set for trial. 
DATED this f day of October, 1983. 
Respectfully submitted, 
/ c^r A 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT ' \ /£. " •• 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION et al., 
Defendants. 
ORDER OVERRULING AND 
DENYING DEFENDANTS' 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 8503 
This matter having come before the Court on Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and the Court having reviewed the 
affidavits in support of said Motion and the affidavits in oppo-
sition thereto, and the Court having reviewed the Memorandums of 
Points and Authorities, and good cause appearing therefor; 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that said Motion for Summary Judgment 
be and the same hereby is OVERRULED and DENIED, reserving to the 
Defendants the right to renew said Motion at the time of pretrial 
and at the completion of discovery. 
DATED this 7 day of May, 1982. 
VRLAN B' 
^District Jud/je 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on this j g day of May, 1982, 
I mailed a copy of the above ORDER to the following: PATRICK H. 
FENTON, ESQ., 13 West Hoover Avenue, Cedar City, Utah 84720; 
ROBERT BRAITHWAITE, ESQ., 110 North Main, Suite H, Cedar City, 
Utah 84720; and ALLAN L. LARSON, ESQ., 10 Exchange Place, 11th 
Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110. 
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r 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
P. O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Telephone: 5 21-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff, SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, Civil No. 8503 
H. L- BRADLEY, ARTHUR O. 
STEWART, and GRANT HINCHCLIFF, 
r 
Defendants• 
Defendants' Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment 
coming on regularly for hearing on January 7, 1983, before 
The Honorable J. Harlan Burns, District Court Judge, and 
plaintiff being present in person and through her attorney, 
Patrick H. Fenton, and Allan L. Larson and Robert T. Braithwaite 
appearing on behalf of the defendants, and the Court having 
reviewed the pleadings, affidavits, depositions and memoranda 
of authorities, and defendants having objected to the affidavits 
of Patrick. H- Fenton, Charlene Rowley, and Jay Jenson, and 
moving to strike same for insufficiency pursuant to Rule 56, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the matter having been fully 
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argued by counsel, and submitted to the Court for decision, 
and the Court being fully advised in the premises, and the 
Court accordingly finding that the affidavits of Patrick H. 
Fenton and Jay Jenson are legally insufficient'to raise any 
material issue of fact, and striking same, and the Court 
further finding that there exists no issue of material fact 
relative to the occurrence which is the subject of plaintiff's 
Complaint, and the Court further finding that the defendants 
breached no duty to the plaintiff, and that defendants are not 
liable to the plaintiff for the injuries sustained as a result 
of the occurrence of February 21, 1979, and having concluded 
that defendants' motions should be granted, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the affidavits of 
Patrick H. Fenton and Jay Jenson are stricken, and that defen-
dants' Motions to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment should be, 
and the same hereby are, granted, and plaintiff's Complaint is 
hereby dismissed with prejudice and upon the merits, and 
Summary Judgment is hereby entered in favor of the defendants •• 
and against the plaintiff, no cause of action, defendants to 
recover costs. 
Dated this /><^day of ^^^^^^UU-t^U, 1983. 
BY THE COURT: 
M. 
J. Harlan Burns 
District Court Judge 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Margo D. Colegrove, being first duly sworn, deposes and says: 
That she is employed in the law offices of Sne»w, Christensen 
& Martineau, attorneys for defendants 
< ^ herein; 
that she served the attached NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT 
(Case No. 8503 ) upon the parties listed below by placing 
a tru.tr and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
Patrick H. Fenton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
154 North Main Street 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq. 
Cedar City Attorney • 
P. 0. Box 249 
Cedar City, UT 84720 
and mailing the same, postage prepaid, on the 3rd day 
of February , 1983. 
/AM^) 
' /^largo D. Colegrove 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 3rd day of February , 19 83 
(2lo^n^ /fe^L^^ 
Notary Public Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ALLAN L. LARSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
H. L.BRADLEY, ARTHUR O. 
STEWART, and GRANT 
HINCHCLIFF, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 8503 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GRANT HINCHCLIFF, being first duly sworn, upon oath, 
deposes and says: 
1. On or about February 21, 1'979, I was employed as an 
officer of the Cedar City Police Department, having been a 
member of said department for about two years. 
2 At approximate 1 y 11:20 p. in, on the evening of 
February 20, 1979, Officer Bruce Marshall, also of the Cedar 
City Police Department and I stopped a black Chevrolet driven 
by Eugene Anderson in the company of his brother Neil Anderson, 
because we suspected that the driver was operating the auto-
mobile under the influence of alcohol. 
3 It. was apparent that both Eugene and Neil Anderson were 
intoxicated. Eugene was informed by Officer Marshall that he 
was being placed under arrest for driving under the influence 
of alcohol. Both Andersons were taken to the Iron County J-:--l 
to process Eugene Anderson's arrest and make arrangements fox 
both men to be transported home. 
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4 I personally supervised Neil Anderson during the time 
that the breathalyzer tests were being performed on his brother 
Eugene. This was necessary to prevent his interference with 
the breathalyzer tests. Neil Anderson demonstrated wide emo-
tional swings during this time but was controllable at all 
times and did not behave in a manner necessitating his incar-
ceration for disorderly behavior or other similar charge. 
At no time did I believe that Neil Anderson's condition 
endangered the safety of others. 
5. I thereafter contacted Neil Anderson's wife Charlene, 
explained the situation to her and asked for her assistance 
in transporting Neil home. Neil was released into his wife's 
custody, I personally placed Neil in the passenger side of 
his wife's vehic 1 e at the ja.i 1 and. Neil indicated that he 
would go home and go to bed. 
6. Shortly thereafter, while Eugene Anderson's bail was 
being arranged, Mrs. Neil Anderson telephoned the Cedar City 
Police Department offices and stated that Neil was causing 
a disturbance at the trailer park where he lived. Sergeant 
Harold Bradley, who took the call, indicated that Neil was 
threatening to kill people with his gun. 
7. Sergeant Bradley, Officer Art Stewart and I responded 
to Mrs. Anderson's call. I traveled in my own patrol car, 
following Sergeant Bradley and Officer Stewart to Kelly's 
Trailer Court where Neil Anderson's trailer was located. 
8. Neil Anderson's trailer was the second trailer from, 
the south end, on the east side of the street. This trailer 
is depicted by a .letter "A" on the attached diagram, which 
I drew on or about February 21, 19 7 9, and hereby incorporate 
into this Affidavit. Sergeant Bradley parked his patrol, car 
just south of the Anderson, trailer as shown, by the "" #4" on 
the diagram. I parked facing south, just to the north of 
the Anderson trailer as indicated by the "#1", and adjacent 
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to a white pickup truck with the initials C.P.U. painted on 
the door. This truck is indicated by a "#2" on the attached 
diagram. The white automobile driven by Charlene Anderson 
to take Neil home from the jai 1 was parked in the driveway 
parallel to the Anderson trailer, and is shown 011 the dia-
gram by a"#3M. 
9, As I exited my car, Sergeant Bradley and Officer 
Stewart proceeded toward the trailer's porch which was 
located on the north side of the trailer. Sergeant Bradley, 
upon reaching the trailer door, apparently saw Neil Anderson 
approaching the door with a rifle in his hand. Sergeant 
Bradley shouted a warning about the gun then ran to the 
northwest corner of the trailer, taking cover in the position 
shown as "Bradley" on the attached diagram. The trailer 
door opened and Neil Anderson emerged carrying a short-
barreled rifle. 
10. Officer Stewart had no time to seek cover and was 
standing in the grassy area between the Anderson trailer and 
the white Chevrolet in the position marked "Stwt," when 
Anderson emerged from hi s trailer, Officer Stewart did not 
have his gun drawn and attempted to convince .Anderson to put 
the rifle down, Anderson refused to do so and lowered the 
gun barrel so as to point it at Officer Stewart. My position 
is depicted on the attached diagram, by "Hii ich " Sergeant 
Bradley and I also admonished Anderson to discard his rifle. 
Both Sergeant Bradley and 1 at, thi s time drew our own guns. 
11 , ,Anderson refused to put his ri f 1 e dowi i,, He con,tinued 
to point the muzzle in, the direction of Officer Stewart. 
Officer Stewart moved slowly back and forth to stay ou* c. f 
the rifle's line of fire, and continued talking to Anderson. 
Mrs. Anderson also emerged from the trailer three times and 
talked to Anderson, attempting to convince hira to put his 
gun down, Anderson refused to listen, He indicated that he 
did not want his brother held, in jail, but refused to accept 
our assurances that Eugene*s bail had been processed and 
Eugene would return home soon. 
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12. Before Officer Stewart could reach cover, the rifle 
discharged, while pointing in the direction of Officer 
Stewart and directly in line with the trailer of Marjorie 
Durand, which was due west across the street from the Anderson 
trailer. Mrs Durand*s trailer is indicated on the attached 
diagram by a "B". I saw Officer Stewart fall to the ground 
and believed him to be shot. I fired three rounds at 
Anderson. Sergeant Bradley and Officer Stewart also returned 
Anderson's fire. 
13. Anderson had apparently been struck by the return 
fire and began to slump into a sitting position. As he did 
so his rifle discharged again, this time in my direction, I 
fired three more shots at Anderson.
 ][: a l s o h e a r d o t h e r s h o t s 
being fired and saw that Sergeant Bradley was also returning 
Anderson's fire. 
14 Anderson's wife then emerged from the trailer and 
took the rifle from her husband. She asked for our help. 
Sergeant Bradley and Officer Stewart approached Anderson first. 
It was apparent that Anderson had been severely wounded and 
was either dying or dead, 
15. The accompanying diagram accurately depicts the 
positions of all parties at the time the first shot was fired. 
Sergeant Bradley, Officer Stewart and I were all facing east 
to southeast during the exchange of gunfire. Sergeant Bradley, 
having observed the direction of Anderson's first shot, was 
concerned about the occupants of the trailer immediately 
across the street to the west of the Anderson trailer. 
16. Sergeant Bradley proceeded to check said trailer and 
found that a woman, later identified as Marjorie Durand, had 
been shot ii i, the lower leg, An ambulance was called for and 
first aid was administered until the ambulance arrived. 
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17. I was in a position to observe all of the parties 
engaged in the exchange of gunfire. At no time did Sergeant 
Bradley, Officer Stewart or 1 fire our weapons in the 
direction of Mrs. Durand's trailer, which was behind us as 
we returned Anderson's fire. Only Anderson's shots could 
have resulted in Mrs. Durand's injury. 
Dated this 47W day of vJAjJ^tec/ 198 2, 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this '/ ^ • day of QtiA'MA 
1982. 
My Commission Expires: 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
JL 
-ommissip. 
-5-
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss, 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
'A H-it .,. COLEGROVE , be; I ng du 1 y s wori i, s ay s ; 
T h • J • '. ie is employed in the offices of Sno w, CI i r i s t e i I s e n 
£ Mai tine-i'-. , Attorneys for defendants 
herein; 
that she served the attached AFFIDAVIT of Grant Hinchcliff 
(Case Number 8503 ) 
upon plaintiff by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
addressing " - to: 
Patrick H. Fenton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq. 
Cedar City Attorney 
P. 0. Box 249 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
a i J d in a 13 11 i g 11 i e s a m e , f > < :»s t a g e p r e - j a i d, o n t h e 18th d a y o f 
January , 19 82, ' 
^>^e^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of January
 t 
19 82. 
Notary Public LC
Residing in the State of Utah 
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w 
ALLAN L. LARSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR 
O. STEWART and GRANT 
HINCHCLIFF, 
Defendants. 
. AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 850 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
) ss. 
IRON COUNTY ) 
HAROLD L. BRADLEY, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. On or about February 21, 1979, I was employed as a 
sergeant in the Cedar City Police Department,. Iron County, Utah 
having been a member of said department for approximately 11 
years. 
2. Shortly after midnight, on February 21, 1979, I received 
a phone call at the offices of the Cedar City Police Department 
from Mrs. Neil Anderson. Mrs. Anderson indicated that her 
husband was causing a disturbance at the trailer park where he 
resided, in that he was threatening to get his gun and start 
killing people. 
3. In response to Mrs. Anderson's call I took officer Art 
Stewart of the Cedar City Police Department with me in my patrol 
car and proceeded to the Anderson trailer which was located at 
Kelly's Trailer Park, Officer Grant Hinchcliff, also of the 
Cedar City Police Department followed in his own patrol car. 
I parked my car slightly sough of the west end of the Anderson 
trailer, which was located on the east side of the street. On Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the diagram attached hereto and hereby incorporated into this 
Affidavit, the Anderson trailer is indicated by a "AM and 
my car is indicated by a "#4M. Officer Hinchcliff parked his 
car slightly north of the Anderson trailer, as shown by a M#l" 
on the attached diagram. 
4. Officer Hinchcliff remained by his patrol car in the 
position designated by "Hinch" on the diagram, while Officer 
Stewart and I approached the steps located on the north side 
of the Anderson trailer. Through the windows on the west end 
of the trailer, I saw an individual appearing to be Neil 
Anderson, who was personally known to me. 
5. Upon reaching the front door of the trailer, I could 
see Neil Anderson through the window of the door, approaching 
the door with a rifle in his hands. I shouted a warning to 
Officers Stewart and Hinchcliff about the rifle and immediately 
stepped back to the northwest corner of the trailer to find 
some protection. My position at that time is shown on the 
attached diagram as "Bradley". 
6. Anderson had the apparently loaded rifle in his posses-
ion from the moment that I recognized him in the trailer. At 
no time did I or officer Stewart have an opportunity to disarm 
Anderson before he emerged from the trailer with the weapon. 
7. Neil Anderson stepped onto the trailer's porch with 
the rifle in his hands. Officer Hinchcliff and I had at this 
time drawn our guns, Officer Stewart had been unable to find 
cover before Anderson emerged from his trailer and was standing 
without a drawn weapon on the grass between the trailer and 
a white Chevrolet designated as "#3" on the attached diagram. 
Officer Stewart's approximate location at this time is shown 
by the letters "Stwt" on the attached diagram. 
8. Officer Stewart, Officer Hinchcliff and I all repeatedly 
asked Anderson to put down his gun. Anderson stated that he 
wanted his brother Eugene released from jail. Eugene Anderson 
had been arrested earlier in the evening for driving under 
-2-
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influence of alcohol. Neil Anderson was told that his 
brother's bail had been arranged and that he would be home 
shortly. Anderson did not respond to this information and 
continued to point his rifle in the direction of Officer 
Stewart and Anderson threatened to kill Stewart even if we 
were successful in shooting Anderson. 
9. I observed Anderson release what appeared to be a 
safety mechanism on his rifle and Anderson continued to follow 
Officer Stewart's movements with the rifle. During this 
conversation, Stewart had slowly yet constantly moved and 
tried to avoid the muzzle of Anderson's rifle. 
10. At about the time Officer Stewart reached the northwest 
corner of the grassy area between the trailer and the white 
Chevrolet, Anderson's gun discharged while pointing west 
toward Officer Stewart. I saw Officer Stewart fall to the 
ground and believed that Stewart had been shot. I fired five 
shots at Anderson in rapid succession. 
11. As Anderson, who had apparently been shot, slid into 
a sitting position against the trailer, he fired another shot 
in the direction of Officers Hinchcliff and Stewart, apparently 
striking the white Chevrolet,"#3" on the attached diagram. I 
fired another shot at Anderson and further return fire also 
came from Officer Hinchcliff. Mrs. Anderson then emerged from 
the trailer and took the rifle from Mr. Anderson's hands and 
asked for our assistance. 
12. I then checked Anderson's condition and it appeared 
that he was mortally wounded. I then recalled that the first 
shot fired by Anderson had been aimed directly west from the 
Anderson porch and realized that the bullet must have entered 
the trailer that was on the west side of the street across from 
the Anderson trailer. This trailer is indicated by a HBM on 
the attached diagram. 
-3-
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13. I went to the trailer on the west side of the street 
to check on the safety of its occupants. Through the window 
of the trailer I could see a woman lying on the floor, 
talking on the telephone, and bleeding from a wound in her 
right lower leg. Her position is shown by "M. Dur." on 
the attached diagram. At the urging of myself and Officer 
Stewart, the woman managed to crawl to the door and open it. 
Officer Stewart and I continued to administer first aid to 
the woman until an ambulance arrived. The woman was subse-
quently identified as Mrs. Marjorie Durand. 
14. I was in a position to observe the actions of all 
the parties involved in the exchange of gunfire. None of the 
responding officers, including myself, at any time discharged 
our guns in the direction of Mrs. Durand1s trailer, which 
was behind our backs as we returned Anderson's fire. I care-
fully observed the direction of Anderson's first shot and 
this led to my discovery of Mrs. Durand in her injured con-
dition. I believe and therefore state that only Anderson's 
original shot could have been responsible for the wounding of 
Mrs. Durand. 
Dated thi: 
con Coun ty , Utah 
My7Commi s s i o n , i s s i n . E x p i r e s : 
/I msr 
- 4 -
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARGO b. COLEGROVE, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Attorneys for defendants 
herein; 
that she served the attached AFFIDAVIT of Harold L. Bradley 
(Case Number 8503 ) 
upon plaintiff by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
addressing it to: 
Patrick H. Fenton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq. 
Cedar City Attorney 
P. 0. Box 249 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
and mailing the same, postage pre-paid, on the 18th day of 
January * 1982, ' 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of January
 t 
19 82. 
v_ xl LUsLu YU^y 
Notary Public / 
Residing in the State of Utah 
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ALLAN L. LARSON 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendants 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84110 
Telephone: 521-9000 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MARJORIE J. DURAND, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, 
H. L. BRADLEY, ARTHUR 
O. STEWART and GRANT 
HINCHCLIFF, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT 
Civil No. 8503 
STATE OF UTAH) 
) ss. 
IRON COUNTY ) 
ARTHUR O. STEWART, being first duly sworn upon oath 
deposes and says: 
1. On or about February 21, 1979, I was employed as an 
officer of the Cedar City Police Department, Iron County, Utah 
having been a member of said department for approximately 
four years. 
2. At approximately midnight on the evening of February 
20, 1979, I was with Sergeant Harold Bradley of the Cedar 
City Police Department at the department's offices when 
Sergeant Bradley received a call from Mrs. Neil Anderson 
indicating that her husband was causing a disturbance at the 
trailer park where they lived. 
3. In response to said call I accompanied Sergeant 
Bradley in the latter's car to Kelly's Trailer Park, with 
Officer Grant Hinchcliff following in his patrol car. The 
Anderson trailer was located on the east side of the street, 
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in the position designated by the letter "A" on the attached 
diagram, which I hereby incorporate into this Affidavit. 
Sergeant Bradley and I parked slightly south of the west end 
of the Anderson trailer in the position shown by the "#4" on 
the diagram. Officer Hinchcliff parked further north, as 
shown by the "#1" on the attached diagram. 
4. Sergeant Bradley and I approached the trailer while 
Officer Hinchcliff remained near his car in the position 
designated "HINCH" on the diagram. Through the trailer's 
windows I observed a man who appeared to be Neil Anderson 
standing in the kitchen area of the trailer, working with his 
hands on an unidentifiable object that was lying on a counter 
top. 
5. Sergeant Bradley and I started up the trailer's stairs, 
which were located on the north side of the trailer. Neil 
Anderson approached the trailer door with a rifle in his hands. 
Sergeant Bradley yelled "He's got a gun" following which 
Bradley retreated and took cover behind the northwest corner 
of the trailer in the location marked "Bradley" on the diagram. 
6. At no time did I or the other police officers respond-
ing to Mrs. Anderson's call have an opportunity to take the 
rifle from Neil Anderson's possession before he emerged from 
the trailer brandishing it in a menacing fashion. 
7. I started to retreat towards the street but Neil 
Anderson had stepped onto the porch, gun in hand, while I was 
still on the grass between the trailer and a white Chevrolet 
parked parallel to the trailer. On the attached diagram, 
I was approximately at the position indicated by the letters 
"Stwt" and the white Chevrolet is designated as "#3". 
8. Sergeant Bradley, Officer Hinchcliff and I all attempted 
at this time to persuade Anderson to put his gun down. Mrs. 
Anderson also repeatedly emerged from the trailer and 
attempted to persuade her husband to put down his rifle. I 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
V_/ 
did not have my gun drawn at this time, although Officer 
Hinchcliff and Sergeant Bradley did. Anderson repeatedly 
stated that he wanted his brother Eugene released from jail. 
Eugene Anderson had been arrested for driving under the 
influence of alcohol earlier in the evening while in the 
company of Neil. Yet Neil did not respond to our assurances 
that Eugene's bail was being processed and that his brother 
would return home soon. 
9. During the conversation with Neil Anderson, I moved 
slowly north and south across the lawn backing towards the 
street, trying to avoid the muzzle of the gun that Anderson 
continued to point in my direction. At one point Anderson 
indicated that even if the other officers were successful in 
shooting him, he intended to kill me with the rifle which he 
described as a .350 Magnum. 
10. As I neared the corner of the lawn and sidewalk by 
the right rear corner of the white Chevrolet parked in the i 
driveway, Anderson turned to look at Sergeant Bradley as 
Bradley said something to him. As I took a step to the left, 
Anderson's gun discharged and the bullet passed me to the 
right, heading directly west towards the trailer of Marjorie 
Durand, which is marked by a HBH on the attached diagram. 
11. When Anderson's gun discharged I dove behind the 
white Chevrolet, moved to a more protected position on the 
north side of the car, stood, and fired four rounds at Anderson. 
Sergeant Bradley and Officer Hinchcliff were also returning 
Anderson's fire, from their positions indicated as "Bradley" 
and "Hindi" on the diagram. 
12. As Anderson began to slump into a sitting position, 
his rifle discharged again, the bullet striking the white 
automobile behind which I was t^an<iiftg. Sergeant Bradley and 
Officer Hinchcliff again returned fire, from their same positions. 
13. Mrs. Anderson then emerged from the trailer and took 
the rifle from Anderson's hands. I approached Anderson and 
checked and found that he had no pulse. Sergeant Bradley 
used his radio to contact an ambulance. 
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14o Shortly thereafter I saw Sergeant Bradley pounding 
on the door of the trailer directly west across the street 
from the Anderson trailer. This was the direction which 
Andersons initial shot had traveled. I heard Sergeant 
Bradley ask the trailer's occupant to open the door if that 
were possible. The trailer's occupant managed to open the 
door and I followed Sergeant Bradley into the trailer and 
observed that a woman later identified as Marjorie Durand 
had been struck in the right lower leg by a bullet. I stayed 
with Mrs. Durand and administered first aid until an ambulance 
arrived. 
15. I was in a position to observe the direction of the 
shots fired by Sergeant Bradley, myself and Neil Anderson. 
I was narrowly missed by Anderson's original shot, which was 
aimed directly at the Durand trailer across the street. As 
the Durand trailer was behind the backs of all three respond-
ing police officers, I believe and therefore state that it 
is not possible that Mrs. Durand was struck by a police 
bullet and only Anderson's original shot could have resulted 
in the injury to Mrs. Durand. 
Dated this / c( day of /)xLC- * 1981. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me on_this / 764 day of 
lUQCQMbM , 1981. 
_
 f<U\ 
NO^RY PUBLIC 
Residing in Iron County, Utah 
My Commission Expires: 
/2--I-T3 
-4-
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
MARGO D. COLEGROVE, being duly sworn, says: 
That she is employed in the offices of Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Attorneys for defendants 
herein; 
that she served the attached AFFTDAVTT of Arthur Q. Rt-pwart-. 
(Case Number 8503 ) 
upon plaintiff by 
placing a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope and 
addressing it to: 
Patrick H. Fenton, Esq. 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
13 West Hoover Avenue 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Robert T. Braithwaite, Esq. 
Cedar City Attorney 
P. 0. Box 249 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
and mailing the same, postage pre-paid, on the 18th day of 
January , 1982. ' 
"~7fcxL*r v*^ 
go D. Coleg^Dve 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th day of January
 f 
19 82. 
ULUJL&X fuf\kv 
ry Publi£ 
Notary 
Residing in the State of Utah 
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frLU- <<F{K 
NOTICE OF CLAIM 
TO CEDAR CITY CORPORATION, Cedar City, Utah: 
You are hereby advised that I was injured by flying bullets 
on or about the 21st day of February of 1979 in my home at 1027 North 
Main Street, Trailer Space Number 24, arising out of a bullet exchange 
between Cedar City Police and a gentleman by the name of Anderson, 
who lived adjacent in this heavily populated area of Cedar City, 
Utah. 
You are hereby advised that I have a tremendous hospital 
bill and various other things arising out of being hit in both legs, 
that I have lost two toes and have cut nerves, cut ligaments, torn 
tendons, muscle damage and various other things, and I am advised 
that I will need nerve surgery and therapy for nerves before I am 
through. 
In addition to the physical injury and the pain and suffering, 
my trailer has been damaged and the interior of the trailer is no 
longer fit for human habitation. 
In addition you are advised I am being damaged by loss of 
earning capacity and loss of income. 
While I have no idea what the final bill is going to be, 
it now appears that it will not be under $100,000.00, and may go 
much higher, even as much as one-half million dollars, depending 
of course upon the time I am out of work, the surgery, the hospital-
ization and items of this nature. 
I was hospitalized in Cedar City, Utah by orders of 
Cedar City policemen and have a tremendous hospital bill as a result 
thereof. In addition to this it is my considered opinion that Cedar 
City officers were negligent in this matter from the standpoint of 
allowing a person under the influence of alcohol and worked up to 
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go home after arresting his brother for driving under the influence 
of alcohol and that they are again negligent in answering the call 
in the manner in which the shootout was provoked and brought about 
and the further item that having actual knowledge that a person 
under the influence of liquor was making threats with a gun toward 
them, Cedar City's police force caused a shootout in a heavily pop-
ulated area instead of taking it out into some area that was not 
heavily populated. 
DATED this (/ day of hM e ^ , 1979. 
'maM.s-'ft £U/w-A 
MMJQgJlE M DURAND 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
County of Iron ) 
On the 
ss. 
J/ day of HA A £ // , 1979, per-
sonally appeared before me MARJORIE J. DURAND, the signer of the 
foregoing instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that she executed 
the same. 
NOTARY PUBLIC / 
Residing at { C ^ . ^ c 2e- -?.S. 
My Commission Expires: 
7 r?ihi i ? s ^ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the fore-
going, postage prepaid, to Allan L. Larson, SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU, Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents, 10 Exchange 
Place, Eleventh Floor, P. 0. Box 3000, Salt Lake City, UT 84110, 
this 11th day of October, 1983. 
f-
-17-
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